padārtha
Listing padārtha:
• dravya (substance, there independently) Thursday, October 23, 2008
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• Guna (quality, exists only as inherent in a substance)
• karma (action, exists only as inherent in a substance)
• sāmānya (general) •
vises (specific) •
Samavayo (inherence) According to the
Vaisesika, these are the basic categories essential to explain the reale.Le substances are the substratum quality and actions. Necessarily the qualities inherent in substances (typical example is the blue that is inherent in a vase). They have unique individual qualities (as is this particular irriperibilie blue) representing particularizations second diqualità abstract space and time as a certain color (blue) or taste. Sāmānya Vaisesika is the equivalent of our "universal" and is considered essential to account for why we recognize each cow as a cow. " Vises, in contrast, allows us to recognize each individual as such. It is the cause of the irreducible difference between individuals, as defined in (Halbfass). This difference is irreducible in the sense that the same applies between individual atoms, which then could be distinguished from those who had a view of quite acute. On the contrary, as we shall see, Advaita Vedanta, therefore, the Vaisesika takes seriously the distinction and individuality. Hence, I think, from his take on the real serioil in principle regardless of the observer. Finally, the relation between Samavayo is a Guna, a karma, a universal and specific to its substrate, ie dravya which is inherent. It can also bind a universal quality or action, and finally binds an individual compound (see below "The problem of the existence of clusters") the parties to which it is composed and which are the cause. As in Western philosophy, the various poses inherent problems, especially within an approach that would be corresponding (ie describe the world as it is, independent of the observer). First, there is a risk of regressus ad infinitum. In fact, if need be because of the inherent relation between, for example, a universal substance, it will bind to the same inherent and universal substance? If one postulates a second kind of inherent in these cases, you will then need a third type that binds the inherent second level and so on. Such problems would be inherent if nell'inerenza were more categories (eg universal or specificity). Praśastapāda solves these potential difficulties explaining the inherent needs no further inherence gave himself bound by the facts that links it is connected to these by a report of absolute identity (tādātmya)-which therefore does not require additional bonds. Since then there is one inherent in any universal or it does not extend any specificity. As for the possible of the inherent problem of what happens when objects are no longer binding, Praśastapāda replied that inherence is not touched. It is like a glue that can stick two things together, but it remains so even when the two things no longer exist. Sāmānya, vises, Samavayo (s abhāva, see below) are ontologicamentedistinte categories and are irreducible to other aspects of the world. However, unlike the first three categories, they can only be substrate of abstract properties (known as dharma) and not ontologically based entities (such as substances, qualities or actions). Among these entities is based ontologically the same universal (sāmānya) "existence" (bhava or sattva), therefore, applies only in the first three categories and not himself. The last three or four categories, then, possonosolo have the function of abstract entities (dharmin) do not have concrete existence. To define but also the fact that somehow there is said to Inessa inherent property (dharma) astitva (is-ness), which is a universal and inherent in itself. But abstract entities concrete and coexist in the same list could lead to think that the first three categories are part of a linked list and the oldest purely physical aspect of natural Vaisesika, while the last three or four are due to the influence of the approach epistemological delNyāya, for which the categories are those especially since we have to THINK ilmondo necessarily need. Although the non-Buddhist schools are still in total postulate that think the world is equivalent apensarne existing features regardless of the subject.
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