8.3.1 The problem of the existence of aggregates
aggregates are impermanent objects of our ordinary experience are called avayavin (whole) since they consist of Avaya (parts). These parties are generally composed of a single elemento (per esempio, una zolla di terra sarà fatta di atomi di terra), ma è possibile che vi si mescolino ulteriori elementi (come un cucchiaio di terra sciolto in un ampolla d'acqua). Tali interi sono per i Vaiśeṣika realmente esistenti al di là e al di sopra delle parti che li compongono e che ne sono la causa. Esempi standard di ciò sono il vaso o il tessuto. I vasai indiani producevano prima due metà vaso e poi le riunivano. Dicono i Vaiśeṣika che le due parti del vaso sono la causa del vaso intero e che il vaso intero inerisce in ciascuna delle parti. Similmente,un tessuto finito inerisce in ciascuno dei fili che lo compone e che ne è la causa. Un pubblico poco avvezzo alle categorie Vaiśeṣika potrebbe argue that the entire vessel can not inhere in one part (since this constitutes, in fact, only a part), but the relation of inherence is defined just as the relationship between two entities that exist simultaneously although separate and indeed the all while being distinct from its parts can not exist independently from them. In this regard, it may be worth recalling that the inherent character is an asymmetrical relationship, in contrast to the contact or identity. The effect (the whole pot) is inherent in the cause (the two halves of the pot), but not vice versa. Therefore, the vessel and the tissue is a substance in itself, with its quality (for example, a certain color) and different from the reports and sum of its parts. The final substance is neither atomic nor pervasive, but median. While atoms are pervading and eternal substances, substances medians, created by the aggregation of atoms, are perishable, as the aggregation of atoms can be destroyed. The atoms come together in new combinations and then will not in itself never destroyed.
is easy to imagine, however, that the assertion of the existence of all the above parties is disputed by Buddhists, for which an aggregate does not exist as something new compared to its component parts, as well as a forest does not exist Apart from the trees that compose it. Vaisesika I oppose this reductio ad absurdum logic, arguing that, in fact, the world is composed of aggregates are clearly distinguishable from the atoms that compose them, but faces objections as follows (for which see (2): 75-9), operates mainly in the sample of Buddhist epistemological school, Dharmakirti:
• If the whole is different from the sum of its parts, it weighs exactly as the sum of its parts?
• If the whole is not a conglomeration of parties, how can one object, such as a cloth, is partly red, some blue, some yellow? The color "red" is inherent in the object "cloth" or not?
The average position in the contemporary West would seem at first glance more like a Buddhist one Vaisesika and you may be wondering why you Vaisesika adoprino just to defend a position that gives rise to a series of paradoxes
. The point is that the Buddhist position, however, immediately opens the way to the idea that the aggregates which our experience is commonly referred are only mental constructs. That is, you may get the idea that only the atoms are real and not objects to these compounds. Then, one might think that the atoms are, likewise, mental constructs, and then ultimately the entire outside world is not a product of mind (think of the famous statement by Russell: "The direct realism leads to physics, which shows that the direct realism does not work. Thus, direct realism is false. ").
Realism Vaisesika could not tolerate any of these steps each of which is then actually in the history of Buddhism. The position is opposed
Vaisesika but also to that of Sankhya. It will be recalled that according to the Sankhya in fact the whole material world is un'evoluzone of Prakriti. So, strictly speaking, nothing new is created. The effect is already fully present, even potentially, in his case and Prakriti contains, in essence, the ability to lead the whole world. However, in the Vaisesika, the union of two elements gives rise to something new, not previously occurred in its causes. The author of Nyāyasūtra (I have already explained how the Nyaya tends to absorb Vaisesika to fill the box corresponding to what he calls "object knowable") explains that in fact the existence of distinct clusters of their parties is inferred by the fact that we can throw us a vessel or tissue without them pulling away parties. This last point opens up a critical issue in ontology Vaisesika: how to distinguish between an object that is a whole above the parts and a simple combination of different objects? Why the two halves form a vase and a vase and the water inside do not form a distinct new object (at this point, see (2): 78-9)?
Individual atoms are uncreated and eternal. According to the Vaiśeṣikasūtra, they are too small to be seen and must be inferred from their effects, the objects of our everyday experience. They have no quality (which applies only in the objects of these compounds) and are mere details. According to the Vaisesika, the smallest aggregate is composed by the conjunction of two atoms (or dyad), while the aggregate is the smallest particle of dust visible (than we can see floating in the air against the light), composed three dyads of atoms. These numbers suggest that the approach of classical physics seemingly Vaisesika that contains an arbitrary (why three dyads? Contemporary physics has in fact shown that the atoms are much smaller than that). The most interesting aspect, however, to show the diversity of paradigms between Europe and India, lies in the fact that the criticism of Vaisesika extension are not located on this floor, but on the contrary, deal sull'insostenibilità logic of this approach. He says for example, the Buddhist Vasubandhu (about Vsecolo AD) that if the atoms have an extension, then there are the building latest (since it is always possible to imagine to divide them further). If you do not have an extension, then extension should not have even a dyad of atoms and so on. Why adding particles with no extension you can never turn to an extended body! The answer is Vaisesika empirical analysis to avoid regressus ad infinitum is necessary to postulate the last particle. Incidentally, this paradox is solved by means of modern mathematics in the Newtonian idea of \u200b\u200binfinitesimals, and the ambiguity of the nature of the atom (or is it not matter?) Rather than being settled by physical hypostasized was next to Einstein.
